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WHETHER RELIANCE ON THE WARRANTY IS
REQUIRED IN A COMMON LAW ACTION FOR
BREACH OF AN EXPRESS WARRANTY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The wide use of warranties today provides for an array of unsettled
issues. One unsettled issue is "whether reliance is required to support a
claim of breach of an express warranty"' at common law.2 Reliance in
this sense refers to a buyer's reliance on the truthfulness of a seller's
warranty, not the reliance on a promise necessary for the formation of a
warranty.' The uncertainty over whether reliance on the warranty is re-
quired is evidenced by the split in opinion that has arisen in jurisdictions
that have addressed the issue.4 This Comment examines the reliance
requirement in an action for breach of an express warranty at common
law by focusing on that split in opinion.
The importance of an answer to this dilemma is readily apparent to
both purchasers and sellers of businesses, who on a daily basis are faced
with express warranties which "extend over a wide range of subjects and
cover virtually every aspect of purchaser-seller agreements... "In
transactions involving the sale of a business, sellers may make express
warranties concerning such matters as the business's profitability or the
accuracy of records provided to the purchaser for evaluation."6 Addi-
1. Sidney Kwestel, Freedom From Reliance: A Contract Approach to Express Warranty,
26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 959, 960 (1992). Kwestel argues that regardless of the transaction,
reliance should never play a role in an action for breach of an express warranty. See id. at
969. Rather, all actions involving breach of express warranty should be governed by contract
principles. See id. at 970.
2. This debate also exists under the Uniform Commercial Code, but that is beyond the
scope of this Comment. See Robert S. Adler, The Last Best Argument for Eliminating Reli-
ance from Express Warranties: "Real-World" Consumers Don't Read Warranties, 45 S.C. L.
REV. 429 (1994). The debate centers on the words "basis of the bargain" in Section 2-313 of
the U.C.C., and whether these words require a buyer to rely on the seller's representations to
maintain an action for breach of an express warranty. See id. at 430.
3. See CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g. Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. 1990).
4. Compare CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g. Co., 553 N.E.2d 997 (N.Y. 1990), with Land
v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Hendricks v. Callahan, 972 F.2d 190,
192 (8th Cir. 1992); Shambaugh v. Lindsay, 445 N.E.2d 124,126-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
5. 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 954, at 358 (3d ed. 1964 & Supp. 1997).
6. Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Purchaser's Disbelief in, or Nonreliance Upon, Ex-
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tionally, due to the size of these transactions, the lengthy preparation,
the potential liability, and the likelihood they will not fall under the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the development of the common
law in this area is very important.
This Comment develops and then answers the question of whether
reliance on a warranty should be required in a breach of warranty ac-
tion brought by the buyer of a corporation or of stock. This Comment
(1) outlines the split in authority by focusing on case law from jurisdic-
tions both for and against requiring reliance on the warranty, (2) ana-
lyzes the two conflicting positions, and (3) based on that analysis comes
to a conclusion as to which position represents the most logical, fair,
and economically efficient approach.
II. BACKGROUND
According to Professor Samuel Williston,7 "[t]he law of warranty is
one century older than special assumpsit,8 and the action upon the case
on a warranty was one of the bases upon which the law of assumpsit
seems to have been built."9 Early on, the law of warranty recognized
that an "action on a warranty was regarded as an action in deceit."'0
The basis of the action in deceit was in tort," however; "[t]he fact that
the cause of action was grounded in tort did not remove the fact that it
was contractual in nature and was based upon the breach of warranty as
to the truth or nontruth of the statement which the maker warranted."'' 2
"Eventually, ... the law concerning warranty became the domain of the
press Warranties Made by Seller in Contract for Sale of Business as Precluding Action for
Breach of Express Warranties, 7 A.L.R.5th 841,841 (1993).
7. Professor Samuel Williston has written extensively on many areas of law that involve
the use of warranties. He has published law review articles, see, e.g., Samuel Williston, What
Constitutes an Express Warranty in the Law of Sales, 21 HARv. L. REV. 555 (1908), treatises,
see, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON ET AL., WILLISTON ON SALES (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter
WILLISTON ON SALES], and he wrote the Uniform Sales Act (U.S.A.) (predecessor to the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)), promulgated in 1906, by the National Conference on
Uniform Laws, 3 Ild. at 6.
8. "Special assumpsit" is defined as "an action of assumpsit brought upon an express
contract or promise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (6th ed. 1990). "Assumpsit" is de-
fined as "a common law form of action which lies for the recovery of damages for the non-
performance of a parol or simple contract;... The action of assumpsit differs from trespass
and trover, which are founded on a tort, not upon a contract.. . ." Id
9. 2 WILLISTON ON SALES, supra note 7, at 350.
10. 2 d at 353.
11. See 2 Id. at 354.
12. 2 Id at 355.
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law of contract."'3 As early as 1778, courts recognized "an action in
warranty brought in assumpsit."' 4
The development of the law of warranty has created "a curious hy-
brid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the
law.'3 Professor Prosser notes that "the warranty gradually came to be
regarded as a term of the contract of sale,... for which the normal rem-
edy is a contract action;" however, "[u]nlke other elements of a con-
tract, warranty never has lost entirely its original tort character."' 6
This tort-contract blend is an important distinction in the law of
warranty, and courts today still recognize the "blur" between the two.17
This Comment emphasizes the effect of this tort-contract "blur" on the
element of reliance.
Citing his own law review article, Williston notes:
The nature of the action explains several features in the law of
warranty that would have no proper explanation if the action
sounded wholly in contract. The rule in regard to obvious de-
fects is of this sort. There seems no reason why the seller should
not promise to be answerable in damages for obvious defects,
but this liability in tort is another matter. Just as in deceit, it is
essential that the statements must be such as to induce the plain-
tiff naturally to rely upon them, so in warranty this natural reli-
ance on the seller's assertions was early regarded as essential....
It is obvious however that a buyer might rely on the seller's
statement and be deceived even though he could have found out
the truth by careful inspection, and this was recognized before
long.Y8
Later in his article, Williston mentions reliance as "another re-
quirement of the law of warranty."'9 However, he warns that "[t]here is
danger.., of giving greater effect to the requirement of reliance than it
is entitled to.... [A]s a general rule, no positive evidence of reliance by
the buyer is necessary other than that the seller's statements were of a
13. 2Id.
14. 2 Id at 355-56.
15. 2 Ila at 363 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95,
at 651 (3rd ed. 1964).
16. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 651.
17. See Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
18. 2 WILLISTON ON SALES, supra note 7, at 370 (citing Samuel Williston, What Consti-
tutes An Express Warranty in the Law of Sales, 21 HARv. L. REV. 555, 557 (1908)).
19. Williston, supra note 7, at 570.
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kind which naturally would induce the buyer to purchase the goods and
that he did purchase the goods."'
From the background as set forth above came the definition of ex-
press warranty under section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act (U.S.A.):
Any affirmation of fact or a promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such af-
firmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the
goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No
affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement pur-
porting to be a statement of the seller's opinion shall be con-
21strued as a warranty.
Williston carried the reliance requirement into the U.S.A. definition
of express warranty. This requirement was also recognized in the com-
mon law. Under the common law, express warranty arises "when the
seller makes an affirmation with respect to the article to be sold, pend-
ing the treaty of sale, upon which it is intended that the buyer shall rely
in making the purchase."' Professor Williston has been cited in the
common law for the proposition that "[g]enerally reliance by the buyer
is necessary in an action for breach of the seller's warranty." 3 Even in
New York, a jurisdiction which has chosen to eliminate the common law
reliance requirement, the requirement did once exist. 
2
Throughout the development of the law of warranty, reliance has
been a requirement in an action for breach of an express warranty. Fur-
thermore, "[n]o one disputes that [the Uniform Sales Act] required re-
liance on the part of the buyer to maintain a breach of express warranty
claim." 2' However, since the promulgation of the U.C.C., there has
been a debate as to whether the requirement of reliance contained in
the U.S.A. carried over to the U.C.C.6 Resolution of that debate is be-
yond the scope of this Comment. However, this Comment shows that
the same debate exists at common law and concludes that the best ap-
proach is the contract approach taken by the Court of Appeals of New
20. Williston, supra note 7, at 570.
21. 3 WILLISTON ON SALES, supra note 7, at 4.
22. Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 213 P.2d 964, 968-69 (Kan. 1950).
23. Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445,448 (10th Cir. 1976).
24. See Crocker Wheeler Elec. Co. v. Johns-Pratt Co., 51 N.Y.S. 793, 794 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1898).
25. Adler, supra note 2, at 433.
26. See id at 430-33.
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York.
Ill. BREACH OF AN EXPRESS WARRANTY IN A PURCHASE
AGREEMENT
A seller commonly makes certain warranties in the purchase agree-
ment when negotiating and contracting for the sale of a business or
stock. Examples include profitability, value, adherence to accounting
principles, or that a certain return will be realized. If after the closing of
the sale it is discovered that any of the warranties were untrue, the
buyer may bring an action for breach of warranty. The scenario be-
comes complicated when, before the closing of the sale, the purchaser
obtains information that leads to a belief that the warranty is untrue.
This and similar types of scenarios have been contemplated by sev-
eral commentators.2z According to one author, whether the purchaser is
entitled to bring a claim for breach of warranty "depends for the most
part on whether reliance by the buyer on the seller's promise or af-
firmation of fact in entering into a sales contract is necessary to create
or recover on an express warranty." Thus, the question as posed in the
introduction remains: Under common law, must the buyer of a corpo-
ration or of corporate stock show reliance to succeed on a claim for
breach of an express warranty?
Today, courts remain divided on this issue.29 The next two sections
of this Comment outline the arguments of courts on both sides.
A. Reliance Required
The strongest support for the argument that reliance is a required
element in a cause of action for breach of an express warranty exists in a
series of Tenth Circuit cases interpreting Kansas law." The Tenth Cir-
cuit also points to the Eighth Circuit as a jurisdiction that has taken the
same approach in interpreting Minnesota law.3' An examination of
both of these jurisdictions will outline the position requiring reliance in
an action for breach of an express warranty.
27. See Kwestel, supra note 1, at 960; Wozniak, supra note 6, at 841.
28. Kwestel, supra note 1, at 961.
29. See Pegasus Management Co. v. Lyssa, Inc., 995 F.Supp. 29, 37 (D. Mass. 1998); see
also cases cited supra note 4.
30. See Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445 (D. Kan. 1976); Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Kan. 1997); Professional Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, 834 F. Supp.
1305 (D. Kan. 1993); Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Kan. 1992).
31. See Kirnbrell, 834 F. Supp. at 1311 (citing Hendricks v. Callahan, 972 F.2d 190 (8th
Cir. 1992)).
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1. Kansas
The central case interpreting Kansas law is Land v. Roper.32 Roper
was a large corporation seeking to diversify its business by acquiring a
small local manufacturing company, Land Manufacturing, Inc.
33
Through the course of negotiations, financial statements of the Land
Company were furnished to Roper by E. H. Land.m After negotiations
were completed, but before the closing, the value of the stock dropped
from $4.5 million to $3.8 million." The merger went through, but Roper
tried to rescind the merger seven months later, believing that Land had
misrepresented the condition of the business. 36 Land brought a declara-
tory judgment action, and Roper counterclaimed, seeking damages or
rescission for Land's breach of warranties.3
Roper claimed that the following warranties were breached:
First, the representation by Land that the financial statement
mentioned above had been prepared in accordance with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles ... and presented fairly the
financial position of the Land Company as of the dates thereof
and the results of operations and changes in the financial posi-
tions for the period indicated....
Secondly, it was represented that there had been no adverse
changes in the business, property or general financial condition
of the Land Company as reflected by said financial statements.38
The Court of Appeals of Kansas framed the issue in the following
manner: "Whether in Kansas Reliance is a Necessary Element in an
Action for a Breach of Expressed Warranty. '39 Recognizing that the
law in the state of Kansas was unsettled as to this question,'° the court of
appeals turned to dicta in Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett,41 a
1950 Supreme Court of Kansas case: "The court there said: 'We think
appellants' evidence failed to establish an express warranty and that
32. 531 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1976).
33. See id. at 446.
34. See id. at 446-47.
35. See id. at 446.
36. See id. at 447.
37. See id
38. Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1976).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 448.
41. 213 P.2d 964 (Kan. 1950).
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such a warranty, if made, was relied on."'42 After examining Topeka
Mill, and with deference to the trial court's opinion, the court of appeals
stated that "[g]enerally reliance by the buyer is necessary in an action
for breach of the seller's warranty."43
As further support for their decision, the court of appeals referred
to the U.S.A. and the U.C.C. The court recognized that under the
U.S.A., reliance was a necessary element and that this element has been
carried over to the U.C.C." Based on its conclusion that reliance is a
requirement under both the U.S.A. and the U.C.C., the court concluded
that "it is reasonable to infer that the reliance requirement applicable to
sales of goods would be extended to the transfer or sale of securities. ' '4s
The court of appeals also found support by looking at the "analo-
gous Kansas rule recognizing a cause of action for innocent misrepre-
sentation .... ."6 The court reasoned that "breach of express warranty is
similar to the action for non-negligent or non-intentional misrepresen-
tation since the warranty action emerged from the law of deceit."4'7
Having decided that reliance is necessary in an action for breach of
warranty, the court of appeals examined the facts and held that Roper
did not show reliance. The court noted that "Roper had made an inde-
pendent evaluation of the Land Company and did not rely on Land's
representations at all. Land showed that Roper personnel and consult-
ants had free access to the Land Company financial records and that
Roper was fully aware of a drop-off in sales shortly before the
merger."' s Based on these facts, the court affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing that "reliance was an essential element and in effect holding that
there was substantial evidence to establish that Roper made an inde-
pendent investigation,"" thereby not relying on the warranties.
Following the court of appeals' decision in Land v. Roper, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas began citing Land for the
proposition that, under Kansas law, reliance is a necessary element of a
claim for breach of express warranty. 0 It was not until the 1993 decision
42. Land, 531 F.2d at 448 (quoting Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 213 P.2d 964,
971 (Kan. 1950)).
43. Id. (citation omitted).
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 449.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127,1161 (D. Kan. 1992) ("Reliance is an essen-
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of Professional Service Industries, Inc. v. Kimbrelll that the district
court re-examined its decision in Land.
In Kimbrell, David and Janet Kimbrell were majority shareholders
of an environmental engineering corporation, Hall-Kimbrell (H-K).'
In December of 1989, the plaintiff, Professional Services Industries
(PSI), approached the Kimbrells to negotiate the purchase of H-K.'
After negotiations, the parties executed a stock purchase agreement in
which all of the stock of H-K was sold to PSI.' 4
In March 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began
filing complaints against H-K based on a failure to inspect certain wall-
board for asbestos." Shortly thereafter, PSI brought suit against the
Kimbrells alleging, among other things, breach of warranty based upon
the Kimbrell's failure to notify PSI of impending action by the EPA.5
Like Land, the dispute in Kimbrell centered on "whether, under Kansas
law, reliance was a necessary element in an action for a breach of ex-
press warranty."'  After acknowledging the arguments set forth in
Land," the Kimbrell court examined Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring,59
a 1974 Supreme Court of Kansas case.'°
The court noted that "in Young & Cooper,... the Kansas Supreme
Court held that reliance was not an element for breach of express war-
ranty under the Uniform Commercial Code."61  The court further
pointed out that in Young & Cooper, because the affirmations were
"part of the description of those goods," no reliance was required.
Recognizing this conflict in reasoning, the court also pointed out that
both Land and Young & Cooper cite Topeka Mill for their respective
positions on the reliance issueY However, because Young & Cooper
tial element to a Kansas breach of warranty claim."); Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v.
Sonic Dev. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 533, 541 (D. Kan. 1982) ("In Kansas, it is necessary to prove
both that an express warranty was made, and that it was relied upon by the buyer.").
51. 834 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Kan. 1993).
52. See i. at 1307.
53. See iL
54. See id
55. See id
56. See id at 1310, 1311.
57. Id at 1310.
58. See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
59. 521 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1974).
60. Professional Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, 834 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (D. Kan. 1993).
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id at 1310 n.2.
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involved a sale of goods governed by the U.C.C., the court was able to
distinguish it from the non-U.C.C. transaction in Land." With this con-
flict resolved, the court in Kimbrell held that "PSI must prove the ele-
ment of reliance to recover under a breach of express warranty."'
Finally, in support of its holding, the court in Kimbrell acknowl-
edged the case of Hendricks v. Callahan," which also distinguished its
facts as not being governed by the U.C.C. "Hendricks supports the view
that breach of express warranty claims involving transactions arising
outside the sale of goods context require reliance." 67
2. Minnesota
The Eight Circuit, interpreting Minnesota law, is another jurisdic-
tion that supports requiring reliance on the warranty in a claim for
breach of express warranty. Hendricks v. Callahan involved a purchase
agreement for the sale of stock." Under the purchase agreement, Cal-
lahan, who was selling all of his shares to Hendricks, made certain war-
ranties involving financial statements, title, and pending litigation.69 As
a result of that pending litigation, Hendricks was unable to sell the
property and suffered a substantial loss.70 Hendricks brought suit al-
leging a breach of the warranties and the court framed the issue as
"whether Minnesota law requires a purchaser to rely on the warranty to
succeed in a breach of warranty claim.'
' 1
The resolution of this issue turned on the interpretation of a Su-
preme Court of Minnesota case, Midland Loan Finance Co. v. Madsen,2
which held that "to enable a party relying upon a breach of express war-
ranty to recover, it must be clear and definite that there was actual reli-
ance upon the warranties involved."73 The debate in Hendricks cen-
tered on Minnesota's adoption of the U.C.C. Hendricks argued that the
adoption of the U.C.C., which substituted "basis of the bargain" for the
reliance language, in effect overruled Midland.74 Aware of the changes
64. See id
65. Id. at 1311.
66. 972 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1992).
67. Professional Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, 834 F. Supp. 1305,1311 (D. Kan. 1993).
68. See Hendricks, 972 F.2d at 191.
69. See id
70. See id at 192.
71. Id.
72. 14 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 1944).
73. Id at 481.
74. See Hendricks, 972 F.2d at 193.
1999]
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adopted in the U.C.C., the court noted: "The transaction in this case (as
well as the transaction in Midland) was not a 'transaction[] in goods'
and therefore is not covered by the provisions of the U.C.C."'75
The court was not persuaded by the U.C.C. argument nor by other
cases after Midland that dispensed with reliance, as those cases also
dealt with transactions of goods. 6 Finally, the court did not accept the
"modem view" argued by Hendricks and set forth in CBS Inc. v. Ziff-
Davis Publishing Co.,jwhich "provides that the buyer's reliance on the
warranty is 'wholly irrelevant."'' 8 Conversely, the court was "convinced
[Minnesota] would require some sort of reliance,, 79 thereby upholding
the rule in Midland.
The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Kansas law and the Eight Cir-
cuit's interpretation of Minnesota law provide the strongest support for
requiring reliance on the warranty in an action for breach of express
warranty. As recently as July of 1997, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas has upheld the arguments of both Land and Kim-
brell, by holding "[r]eliance is an essential element to a breach of ex-
press warranty claim not governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code."' Additionally, the Eight Circuit considered and dismissed CBS,
Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.,"' the prevailing case supporting the al-
ternative view of no reliance.'
B. Reliance Not Required
The state courts of New York and Indiana provide the strongest ar-
gument against requiring reliance in a claim for breach of express war-
ranty. The alternative that has been adopted by these jurisdictions
treats the warranty as a bargained-for term of the contract. Therefore,
regardless of whether reliance is present, if there is a breach of the war-
ranty, it is actionable under principles of contract law.
1. New York
In 1990, the Court of Appeals of New York had before it the same
question answered by the Kansas and Minnesota courts above: whether
75. See Hendricks, 972 F.2d at 193 (citation omitted).
76. See id at 193-94.
77. 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000-01 (N.Y. 1990).
78. Hendricks, 972 F.2d at 194.
79. Id.
80. Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1460, 1491 (D. Kan. 1997).
81. 553 N.E.2d 997 (N.Y. 1990).
82. See Hendricks v. Callahan, 972 F.2d 190, 194 (8th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 82:689
1999] RELIANCE IN BREACH OF WARRANTYACTIONS 699
reliance is an essential element in a claim for breach of express war-
ranty s3 In CBS, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.,"4 Ziff-Davis solicited
bids for the sale of certain assets and businesses.8Y Based on the offering
circular (which contained Ziff-Davis's financial condition including op-
erating expenses), CBS made the highest bid.86 As a result, CBS and
Ziff-Davis entered into a purchase agreement which contained certain
warranties regarding the health of the businesses. First, "Ziff-Davis
warranted that the audited income and expense report.., which had
been previously provided to CBS in the offering circular, had 'been
prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles'
(GAAP) and that the report 'present[ed] fairly the items set forth."''' 7
Second, Ziff-Davis warranted that "from July 31, 1984 until the closing,
there had 'not been any material adverse change in Seller's business ...
taken as a whole..' '. Third, Ziff-Davis represented that "all representa-
tions and warranties of Seller to Buyer shall be true and correct as of
the time of the closing."89 Finally, Ziff-Davis warranted that all "repre-
sentations and warranties ... shall survive the closing, notwithstanding
any investigation made by or on behalf of the other party."' After en-
tering into the purchase agreement, but before closing, CBS "discov-
ered information causing it to believe that Ziff-Davis's certified finan-
cial statements and other financial reports were not prepared according
to GAAP and did not fairly depict Ziff-Davis's financial condition."9'
As a result of this discovery, CBS wrote a letter to Ziff-Davis inquiring
as to the misrepresentations. 92 Ziff-Davis responded, assuring CBS that
there was nothing wrong and that they would be held to the closing
date.93 After Ziff-Davis acknowledged that there was a dispute, and
that closing would not be a waiver of any rights, the parties closed.'
CBS then sued for a breach of the warranties.
To answer the question of whether CBS was required to show reli-
ance on the warranties, the Court of Appeals of New York adopted the
83. See CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g. Co., 553 N.E.2d 997,1000 (N.Y. 1990).
84. Id.
85. See id at 998.
86. See id
87. Id (brackets in original).
88. Id at 998-99.
89. Id at 999.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. See id
93. See id
94. See id
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reasoning of Ainger v. Michigan General Corporation."' Just as in
Ainger, the "critical question is not whether the buyer believed in the
truth of the warranted information, as Ziff-Davis would have it, but
'whether [it] believed [it] was purchasing the [seller's] promise [as to its
truth]. '96 The court recognized:
This view of "reliance"-i.e., as requiring no more than reliance
on the express warranty as being part of the bargain between the
parties-reflects the prevailing perception of an action for
breach of express warranty as one that is no longer grounded in
tort, but essentially in contract.'
In Ainger, the court recognized the case of Crocker Wheeler Electric
Co. v. Johns-Pratt Co.,98 as stating that "[lit is elementary that, in order
to entitle the plaintiff to maintain an action for breach of an express
warranty, it must be established that the warranty was relied on.""
However, the Ainger court dismissed that language as "[t]ransplanting
tort principles into contract law," which is "analytically unsound.""'
The court of appeals in Ziff-Davis recognized that this language from
Crocker Wheeler has been criticized.' Later, the court noted a "blur"
that had arisen in New York decisions distinguishing between tort and
contract.' °2 "This may be a result 'consonant with historical attitudes
towards breaches of warranty, which until 1778 had to be sued in tort,'
or that in many cases, indeed, in this case, the breach of warranty is also
a fraud."'0'3
Nevertheless, the court in Ainger explained that the use of the word
"reliance" by New York courts "relates to the first element of proof,
existence of the contract.... The question of whether the promisee
'relied' on the warranty, then, is whether he believed he was purchasing
the promise."'0'
95. 476 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
96. Ziff-Davis, 553 N.E.2d at 1000-01 (brackets in original).
97. Id. at 1001.
98. 51 N.Y.S. 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898).
99. Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting
Crocker Wheeler Elec. Corp. v. Johns-Pratt Co., 51 N.Y.S. 793, 794 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898)).
100. Ainger, 476 F. Supp. at 1224.
101. See Ziff-Davis, 553 N.E.2d at 1002 n.3 (citation omitted).
102. Ainger, 476 F. Supp. at 1225.
103. Id. (quoting Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 558 (2d Cir.
1950)).
104. Id.
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Based on this reasoning, which one commentator has recognized as
"clearly... a contract approach to express warranties,"'O' the court in
Ziff-Davis stated:
The express warranty is as much a part of the contract as any
other term. Once the express warranty is shown to have been
relied on as part of the contract, the right to be indemnified in
damages for its breach does not depend on proof that the buyer
thereafter believed that the assurances of fact made in the war-
ranty would be fulfilled. The right to indemnification depends
only on establishing that the warranty was breached."°
The court also looked analogously to the U.C.C. for instructive sup-
port .107
For these reasons, the New York Court of Appeals reinstated the
breach of warranty claim. Relying on the contract theory enunciated
above, the court stated that a "holding that [Ziff-Davis] should [be ab-
solved from its warranty obligations] would have the effect of depriving
the express warranties of their only value to CBS-i.e., as continuing
promises by Ziff-Davis to indemnify CBS if the facts warranted proved
to be untrue.' lca
After Ziff-Davis, reported cases with similar facts are sparse. How-
ever, in August and December of 1992, two cases involving breach of
warranty in a stock purchase agreement were decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Respectively, these
cases are Galli v. Metz,0'9 and Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy."°
In Galli, the court acknowledged that Ziff-Davis "does curtail the
role of reliance in breach of warranty actions." ' However, Galli also
105. Kwestel, supra note 1, at 989.
106. Ziff-Davis, 553 N.E.2d at 1001 (citing Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. Casualty In-
dem. Exch., 435 F. Supp. 855,860 (D. Mont. 1977)).
107. See id at 1002 n.4.
108. Id. at 1002. The strong dissent in Ziff-Davis relied on the following: First, that the
language of Crocker Wheeler, 51 N.Y.S. at 794, was clear and has been recognized by the
court of appeals in numerous cases. Ziff-Davis, 553 N.E.2d at 1004. Second, that the major-
ity does not point out the qualification on Williston's criticism of Crocker Wheeler. Id Third,
that in place of the well recognized rule of Crocker Wheeler, the court is adopting the Ainger
court's "categorical discussion." Id. Finally, an analogy to the U.C.C., would actually lead to
an affirmation of the language in Crocker Wheeler. Id at 1004-05.
109. 973 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1992).
110. 983 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1992).
111. Galli, 973 F.2d at 151.
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recognized that the result in Ziff-Davis may be limited:
Where a buyer closes on a contract in the full knowledge and ac-
ceptance of facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a
breach of warranty under the terms of the contract, the buyer
should be foreclosed from later asserting the breach. In that
situation, unless the buyer expressly preserves his rights under
the warranties (as CBS did in Ziff-Davis), we think the buyer has
waived the breach.1
2
Metromedia also involved a stock purchase agreement. In Metro-
media, the Second Circuit analyzed the breach of warranty claim
through the framework of Ziff-Davis."' After noting the contract ra-
tionale of the New York Court of Appeals, the court in Metromedia
held that "[s]ince as a matter of law, an express warranty is as much a
part of the contract as any other term, the inclusion in the Agreement
here of the [warranties] established that those representations and war-
ranties were part of the bargain reached.'
1 4
Recently, the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts followed the rationale in Ziff-Davis. The court in Pegasus
Management Co. v. Lyssa,"5 in approaching the reliance question, bal-
anced the conflicting positions in the common law. For the position
adopting the contract approach, the court looked to Ziff-Davis."6 The
Pegasus court balanced the rationale of Ziff-Davis against the required
reliance position taken in Land v. Roper and Hendricks v. Callahan."
Not persuaded by the reasoning of the courts requiring reliance, the
court found that, under Connecticut law, "the plaintiffs do not have to
prove reliance on the express warranties."
8
2. Indiana
The Indiana Court of Appeals has also adopted the position of no-
reliance in actions for breach of express warranty. The court based its
reasoning on a line of older cases and the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in Ziff-Davis. This older line of cases is best repre-
112. Galli, 973 F.2d at 151.
113. See Metromedia, 983 F.2d at 360.
114. Id.
115. 995 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1998).
116. See idU at 37-38.
117. See iL at 38-39.
118. Id. at 39.
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sented by the holding in Shambaugh v. Lindsay.n"9 Shambaugh involved
certain express warranties in a purchase agreement for the sale of
stock." The court began its reasoning by quoting a large portion of
Land v. Roper,12 representing that court's position that reliance is an es-
sential element of a claim for breach of an express warranty.'2 The
court in Shambaugh balanced this argument against the rationale of
Glacier General Assurance Co. v. Casualty Indemnity Exchange," and
held that Glacier represented the better view.'
The court noted that Glacier held that "the warranty is as much a
part of the contract as any other part, and the right to damages on the
breach depends on nothing more than the breach of warranty."' The
Shambaugh court found this reasoning consistent with the law of Indi-
ana, which is represented by the old line of cases referred to above. The
court quoted one of these cases as follows:
[W]hatever, under the circumstances the parties can be said to
have intended by their contract, to that will the seller be held as
to other lawful engagements, and it is not necessary to the
buyer's recovery that he should have been deceived.... One
party is induced by the reliance upon the engagements of the
other contracting party, and in a pleading based upon a breach of
such a warranty, if the warranty be sufficiently shown to have en-
tered into the contract as an intended element thereof, and as a
part of the consideration for the purchase price, it is not neces-
sary, any more than in other suits on contracts, to allege reliance
of the buyer upon the warranty."'
The influence of the New York Court of Appeals is seen in Essex
Group, Inc. v. NilllzI In Essex, the court cited Ziff-Davis for the defini-
tion of warranty,'2 and for its holding "that reliance is not an element of
119. 445 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
120. See id. at 124.
121. 531 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1976).
122. See Shambaugh, 445 N.E.2d at 126.
123. 435 F. Supp. 855 (D. Mont. 1977).
124. See Shambaugh, 445 N.E.2d at 126.
125. lId at 126-27.
126. lId at 127 (quoting McCarty v. Williams, 108 N.E. 370, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1915)).
This language and reasoning traces back to an 1882 Supreme Court of Indiana case, Shordan
v. Kyler, 87 Ind. 38 (Ind. 1882).
127. 594 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
128. See id. at 506.
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a breach of warranty claim."'29
The courts of New York and Indiana provide the strongest argu-
ment for the position that reliance is not an element in a claim for
breach of express warranty. The contract approach of the court in CBS
Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.," and the long history of this reason-
ing in Indiana,"' make this argument quite persuasive. Further, these
are not the only two states that support the no-reliance position. This
position is also followed by the Supreme Court of New Mexico 32 and
the Appellate Court of Illinois. 3'
However, strong support exists on the other side. The extensive and
consistent treatment of the issue by the United States District Court for
the District of Kansas, even after the adoption of the U.C.C., lends
strong support for requiring reliance. Also, the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision in Midland Loan Finance Co. v. Madsen,"' supported
by the interpretation of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hen-
dricks v. Callahan,35 shows that this rationale has existed in Minnesota
for over fifty years. Finally, also supporting the argument for reliance
are cases such as Crocker Wheeler Electric Co. v. Johns-Pratt Co.,"
which show that even in a state that has adopted a no-reliance position,
reliance was required in the past.'
The cases above make it clear that a split in the common law of war-
ranties exists as to whether reliance is required in an action for breach
of such warranties. Although arguments on both sides are persuasive,
weaknesses in each ultimately reveal that one argument is stronger.
IV. ANALYSIS
With public policy and economic efficiency in mind, an analysis of
the cases shows that the contract approach followed by the court in CBS
Inc. v. Ziff-Davis, Inc. represents the best position.
129. Essex, 594 N.E.2d at 506-07.
130. 553 N.E.2d 997 (N.Y. 1990).
131. See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
132 See C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238, 246 (N.M. 1991)
(citing Vitro Corp. v. Texas Vitrified Supply Co., 376 P.2d 41,48 (N.M. 1962)).
133. See Regopoulos v. Waukegan Partnership, 608 N.E.2d 457,461 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(citing Coryell v. Lombard Lincoln-Mercury Merkur, Inc., 544 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989)); Hrosik v. Keim Builders, 345 N.E.2d 514, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)); Vasco Truck-
ing Inc. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 286 N.E.2d 383,386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)).
134. 14 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 1944).
135. 972 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1992).
136. 51 N.Y.S. 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898).
137. See &L at 794.
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A. The Tort/Contract "Blur"
As noted above, the development of the law of warranty has created
a "curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract,
unique in the law." m This hybrid likely grew out of "historical attitudes
towards breaches of warranty, which until 1778 had to be sued in
tort.
,, 9
This mixing of contract and tort results in one of the weaknesses in
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning and interpretation of Kansas law. In
Land v. Roper, the United States Court of Appeals argued that an ac-
tion for non-negligent misrepresentation provides analogous support
for answering the reliance question in a breach of warranty action.'4
The court stated: "The breach of express warranty is similar to the ac-
tion for non-negligent or. non-intentional misrepresentation since the
warranty action emerged from the law of deceit. 1 41 What the court
failed to note is that "the warranty gradually came to be regarded as a
term of the contract of sale.., for which the normal remedy is a con-
tract action."1 42 This developmental fact detracts from the Land court's
analogous argument.
Further evidence of the weakness of this analogy is the failure of the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas to engage in the
same reasoning. In Professional Service Industries, Inc. v. Kimbrell,'43
the court did not look to any deceit-based claims for analogous reason-
ing. This is especially interesting because in addition to their claim for
breach of warranty, the Kimbrells alleged deceit and negligent misrep-
resentation.Y Evidence of the separation of the tort and contract-based
claims is also seen in Shambaugh v. Lindsay'45 and Pegasus Management
Co. v. Lyssa,46 where the courts considered the arguments in Land but
chose to follow the contract approach.
It should be noted that analogy to tort-based claims should not be
wholly abandoned.47 Rather, it should not be applied to breach of war-
138. 2 WILLISTON ON SALES, supra note 7, at 363 (citation omitted).
139. Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citation
omitted).
140. Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445,448-49 (10th Cir. 1976).
141. IcL at 449.
142. PROSSER, supra note 15, at 651.
143. 834 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Kan. 1993).
144. See id at 1307.
145. 445 N.E.2d 124,127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
146. 995 F. Supp. 27,39 (D. Mass. 1998).
147. "[Iln the area of products liability, the tort theory of breach of warranty has been
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ranty claims arising out of contracts, such as purchase agreements. As
the New York Court of Appeals has said:
The express warranty is as much a part of the contract as any
other term. Once the express warranty is shown to have been
relied on as part of the contract, the right to be indemnified in
damages for its breach does not depend on proof that the buyer
thereafter believed that the assurances of fact made in the war-
ranty would be fulfilled. The right to indemnification depends
only on establishing that the warranty was breached."
B. The U. C.C. Analogy
A weakness in both the Tenth and Eight Circuit Courts' reasoning
relates to their analogous use of the Uniform Commercial Code. In
Land, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit pointed to the U.S.A.
as containing a reliance requirement."' According to the court, com-
ment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-313 "has been held to express an intent that
the reliance requirement be continued."' Therefore, "[i]t is reasonable
to infer that the reliance requirement applicable to sales of goods would
be extended to the transfer or sale of securities." ''
This reasoning is flawed. As the court in Professional Service In-
dustries, Inc. v. Kimbrell, pointed out:
The reasoning of Roper is difficult to reconcile with Young &
Cooper.... [T]he law in effect at the time Roper was decided
was the UCC, and the Kansas Supreme Court had interpreted
the UCC's breach of express warranty provision to eliminate the
element of reliance. Thus, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning appears
to be at odds with the Kansas Supreme Court's conclusion in
Young & Cooper.'52
utilized to avoid the consequences of contract law with regard to privity, statute of limita-
tions, survival of actions, and damages." Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209,
1226 n.65 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 634-
35 (4th ed. 1971)).
148. CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g. Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1001 (N.Y. 1990) (citing Gla-
cier Gen. Assurance Co. v. Casualty Indem. Exch., 435 F. Supp. 855, 860 (D. Mont. 1977)).
149. See Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445,448 (10th Cir. 1976).
150. Id
151. Id
152. Professional Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, 834 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (D. Kan. 1993).
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The Kimbrell court justified this flawed reasoning with the Land
court's additional rationale of comparing a breach of warranty claim to
an innocent misrepresentation claim.153 However, as shown above, that
reasoning is also flawed, leaving no escape for the Tenth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit's reasoning presents a different problem. An
analysis of the comments to the Minnesota version of the U.C.C. and to
the U.C.C. itself, leave ambiguous whether Minnesota would require
reliance.' Despite this ambiguity, the Hendricks court refused to con-
sider cases that lay out the elements of breach of warranty under the
Minnesota U.C.C. The Hendricks court recognized that "to establish a
warranty claim the plaintiff must prove three elements: [1] the exis-
tence of a warranty, [2] a breach, and [3] a causal link between the
breach and the alleged harm."5 5 The court further stated "[t]hat these
are the elements of a breach of warranty claim under the U.C.C. in
Minnesota is beyond dispute."n' Nevertheless; the court refused to con-
sider these cases because they involved transactions in goods, unlike the
transaction in Hendricks. This reasoning is flawed because although the
case may be distinguished, the court was reasoning by analogy. The
cases would have aided in their comparison with the U.C.C., but be-
cause there is no element of reliance in Peterson, that reasoning would
not have brought the court to the result it sought.
C. Two Types of Reliance
An area of confusion that seems to plague courts advocating the re-
liance requirement relates to two potential meanings of the word "reli-
ance." This is best illustrated by the language in Hendricks, which
states that "[e]ssential to the court's rulings is its determination that
Minnesota law requires a party alleging a breach of express warranty to
have relied on that warranty when making the contract."1' 7 Is that "reli-
ance" the same that is required to show a breach of warranty? Courts
seem to confuse the "reliance" that is required to form the express war-
ranty, and the "reliance" on the warranty arguably required in a claim
153. See id
154. See Hendricks v. Callahan, 972 F.2d 190, 194 (8th Cir. 1992). Compare MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 336.2-313 Minn. com. subsec. 2-313(1)(a) (West 1966 & Supp. 1998), with
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-313 U.C.C. com. 3 (West 1966 & Supp. 1998).
155. Hendricks, 972 F.2d at 193 (quoting Peterson v. Bendix Home Sys., 318 N.W.2d 50,
52-53 (Minn. 1982)).
156. Id.
157. Id. 192 (emphasis added).
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for breach. In Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett,' the Kansas Su-
preme Court stated that "whether an affirmation or representation con-
stitutes a warranty is a question of the intention of the seller and the re-
liance placed thereon by the buyer."'' 9 This "reliance" is the type
needed to form a warranty, not the type needed to recover for a breach.
In its holding, the court stated that "appellant's evidence failed to es-
tablish an express warranty and that such a warranty, if made, was re-
lied upon by Mrs. Triplett. ''lW This is the reliance necessary to sustain a
claim for breach of express warranty.161
This confusion was acknowledged by the Ainger court which stated:
"In these contexts, however, the word relates to the first element of
proof, existence of the contract,... [t]he question of whether the
promisee 'relied' on the warranty, then, is whether he believed he was
purchasing the promise."'62 As seen in the New York cases, it is not the
reliance requirement that disappears, but the confusion. The Ziff-Davis
court pointed this out by saying: "We do not hold that no reliance is re-
quired, but that the required reliance is established if, as here, the ex-
press warranties are bargained-for terms of the seller." ' Adopting the
no reliance approach would resolve the confusion in determining to
what "reliance" refers.
D. What About Midland?
Midland is the only case that remains viable as support for the re-
quirement of reliance. The Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that
"[t]o enable a party relying upon breach of express or implied warranty
to recover, it must be clear and definite that there was actual reliance
upon the warranties involved."'1' However, Midland is distinguishable
because it involved a transaction for the sale of goods; a contract for the
sale of an automobile.' 6 Additionally, Midland was decided prior to the
adoption of the U.C.C. The U.S.A., which was in effect at that time, re-
158. 213 P.2d 964 (Kan. 1950).
159. Id at 969-70.
160. Id. at 971.
161. It should be noted that the "reliance" argument is further complicated by the fact
that both Young & Cooper and Land cite to Topeka for opposite positions on reliance. See
Professional Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, 834 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 n.2 (D. Kan. 1993).
162. Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
163. CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g. Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1002 n.5 (N.Y. 1990).
164. Midland Loan Fin. Co. v. Madsen, 14 N.W.2d 475,481 (Minn. 1944).
165. See id. at 268.
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quired reliance in a claim for breach of express warranty.'" Therefore,
it is not surprising that Midland would require reliance as an element.
That does not mean that reliance should be a requirement in a common
law action for breach of warranty involving a transaction outside the
U.C.C.
Similar to the Hendricks court's interpretation of Midland, the
Court of Appeals of New York, in Ziff-Davis, was faced with the inter-
pretation of a very old New York case relating to the sale of an insulat-
ing material; a sale of goods." Unlike Hendricks, the court in Ziff-
Davis was interpreting an intermediate appellate decision, and chose to
dismiss its rule as dicta. As the highest court in the state, the Ziff-Davis
court's opinion is more persuasive than the opinions of the District
Courts of the Tenth and Eight Circuits. This is apparent in the case of
Pegasus Management Co. v. Lyssa, Inc., where the court was not per-
suaded because "the Land and Hendricks decisions were by federal
Courts of Appeals that were trying to divine the state law in circum-
stances in which the highest court in the state had not been presented
with the issue.""'
For these reasons, and due to the long line of cases out of Indiana
supporting the contract approach,69 the position taken by Ziff-Davis is
the most consistent with the law of warranty and the most persuasive.
E. Economically Efficient
In addition to the contract theory being the most consistent with the
law and the most persuasive, it is also economically efficient. The con-
tract theory ensures that the buyer and seller will get what they bar-
gained for in the contract.' It also ensures that the buyer will get the
promises for which he or she paid.'
The contract theory also prevents the seller from forcing a closing
when the buyer has knowledge that the warranties were false, thus fore-
closing action by the buyer.'2 It may seem from the protections above
166. See Adler, supra note 2, at 433.
167. See Crocker Wheeler Elec. Co. v. Johns-Pratt Co., 51 N.Y.S. 793 (N.Y. App. Div.
1898).
168. Pegasus, 995 F. Supp. at 39.
169. See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
170. See Ziff-Davis, 553 N.E.2d at 1002. "CBS was not merely buying identified con-
sumer magazine businesses. [CBS] was buying businesses which it believed to be of a certain
value based on information furnished by seller which the seller warranted to be true." Id.
171. See U
172. See id
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that the buyer gets a better deal under the contract approach. This may
be true, but not for the reasons above. First, these protections must be
balanced against the possibility of waiver."' The Second Circuit in Galli
recognized that "unless the buyer expressly preserves his rights under
the warranties (as CBS did in Ziff-Davis), we think the buyer has
waived the breach.' 7 4
In Associates of San Lazaro v. San Lazaro Park Properties, a case
involving the sale of a mobile home park, the Colorado Supreme Court
recognized that "[o]ne who intentionally relinquishes a known right
waives that right."175
In the context of purchase and sale agreements, the determina-
tion of whether the buyer's conduct constitutes an intentional
relinquishment of a seller's express warranty includes considera-
tion of the source of information available to the buyer and a de-
termination of whether the buyer clearly relied upon [the] in-
formation.1
76
The Colorado Supreme Court noted that this rule promotes effi-
ciency because "sellers are encouraged to warrant only to that which
they know they can fulfill."'" However, the court also recognized that
the rule may give the buyer an advantage if the buyer does not actually
rely on the warranty.' In that situation the buyer may wait and see
how the transaction turns out before deciding whether to bring a
claim.
7 9
Although the waiver theory may give a slight advantage to the
173. One commentator argues that a "post-contract disclosure to the buyers" should not
matter. Kwestel, supra note 1, at 991 n.106. "Why should the buyers' choice seemingly be,
according to Galli, either to refuse to close and sue for damages or to close and waive their
right to damages?" Id.
The answer to that question lies in the contract theory which allows the parties to con-
tract around situations such as these. In other words, the parties may expressly reserve their
rights by contract as they did in Ziff-Davis. See Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.
1992).
174. Galli, 973 F.2d at 151.
175. Associates of San Lazaro v. San Lazaro Park Properties, 864 P.2d 111, 115 (Colo.
1993).
176. Id "[E]ven though the buyer makes an inspection the warranty is not rendered
inoperative unless the buyer is clearly relying upon his own investigation and waives the war-
ranty." Id- at 115 n.3 (quoting Rudd v. Rogerson, 297 P.2d 533,538 (Colo. 1956)).
177. Id at 115.
178. See id
179. See id.
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buyer, when balanced against the advantages above and because it rep-
resents a more accurate fit with the common law, it is the better ap-
proach. Furthermore, the contract and waiver theories reduce the bur-
den on the courts by encouraging parties to contract more carefully.
The parties' increased consciousness as to what they are warranting re-
duces the possibility of litigation and makes the contract more clear,
aiding a court with interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
The long history of the law of warranty, combined with a mixture of
analogous reasoning based on the different laws interpreting warranties,
creates a confusing backdrop for analyzing the reliance issue. However,
arising out of the mist of that backdrop are two distinct lines of reason-
ing:" the first requiring reliance on a warranty in a breach of warranty
claim; the second applying a contract approach to a breach of warranty
claim. Through an analysis of the two positions, it is clear that the con-
tract approach is the most logical, fair, and economically efficient. The
approach protects the buyer's promise as a bargained-for term of the
contract,18 protects the seller through the doctrine of waiver,lu and
promotes efficiency by encouraging clearer contracts that result in less
litigation. Finally, this approach makes the most sense to these buyers
and sellers of corporations who never enjoy having years of work com-
promised by last minute indecision.
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